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Abstract: 
Public organizations often turn to the private sector for guidance and best practice examples when faced with 
technological or organizational change. However, private-sector business practices do not always translate neatly into 
the government domain. In this study, we analyze data from 82 collaborative projects in the public safety domain to 
establish whether public-sector IT outsourcing (ITO) practices match practices that researchers have documented in 
the private sector. In particular, we focus on the ITO decision process components and outcomes that they have 
identified as challenging for public-sector ITO. Results show that: 1) public organizations adopt ITO due to expertise 
gaps and cost considerations more than any other factor, 2) capital funding’s availability affects ITO decisions, 3) 
public-sector organizations outsource complex systems more often, 4) multiple successful ITO configurations exist, 
and 5) like the private sector, knowledge sharing and the vendor’s involvement in defining requirements represent 
important factors for whether ITO projects in public organizations succeed. Our descriptive, exploratory study extends 
previous ITO research by providing a framing for the fragmented literature on ITO in the public sector and laying a 
foundation for more systematic and theory-based scholarship. Our observations also guide governmental practitioners 
in their sourcing decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
Public organizations often turn to the private sector for guidance and best practice examples when faced 
with technological or organizational change. However, private-sector business practices do not always 
translate neatly into the government domain. Public organizations often need to adapt these practices to 
accommodate the public context’s unique requirements. Partnerships with private companies and 
outsourcing to private-sector vendors represent two organizational strategies that public organizations 
have successfully embraced (i.e., Joha & Jansenn, 2010); however, these cross-sectoral collaborations 
face many challenges, such as conflicts in ethics and values (Mulgan, 2005), mismatches in behavior 
expectations (Chen & Perry, 2003), and legal constraints (i.e., Ruzzier, Sohal, Katna & Zyngier, 2008). 
Nevertheless, these partnerships have gained traction in, among others, the information technology 
outsourcing (ITO) domain. 
Both private and public organizations have used ITO for almost three decades, and the frequency with 
which public organizations use it has increased significantly in recent years (Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia & 
Romero, 2012). However, in government settings, ITO projects have a high failure rate (Sullivan & 
Ngwenyama, 2005; Vintar & Stanimirovic, 2011), and effectively managing an outsourced project remains 
challenging and prone to pitfalls.  
In this study, we establish whether public-sector ITO practices match practices that researchers have 
documented in the private sector. In particular, we focus on the ITO decision process components and 
outcomes that they have identified as challenging for public-sector ITO.  
In their 97-pages long seminal paper, Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, and Jayatilaka (2004) proposed an 
ITO-inspired interpretation of Simon’s (1960) classic decision making model. We adopt Dibbern et al.’s 
(2004) model (which we refer to henceforth as the “stage model”) as the guiding structure to explore and 
as the driver for three overriding research questions that direct this study. We then map our findings from 
comprehensively reviewing the private sector ITO literature (Wiener, Vogel & Amberg, 2010; Lacity, Khan, 
Yan, & Willcocks, 2010; Lacity, Yan, & Khan, 2017) and many public-sector ITO studies onto the stage 
model to further frame our analysis. This paper is descriptive and exploratory in nature, and we do not 
attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the highly cited stage model. Rather, with this study, we lay the 
groundwork to stimulate future theory development by drawing attention to empirically validated cross-
sectoral differences using well-established framing. In addition, public-sector organizations can use the 
evidence we present about the model’s efficacy to better guide ITO decision making. 
We use data from a large set of phone interviews with representatives of collaborative projects in the public 
safety domain (called “public safety networks” or PSNs) as a source of empirical evidence for the public 
sector-specific ITO trends. We found that the PSNs commonly used ITO and that cost considerations and 
staffing gaps instigated ITO adoption (i.e., the “why” component in the stage model). We also note the 
influence that risk and uncertainty coming from the PSNs’ dependence on capital funding had on their ITO 
decisions. Contrary to parallel findings in the private sector, we found that public-sector organizations had a 
higher likelihood to outsource highly complex projects. Our findings also reinforce the importance of 
knowledge- and expertise-acquisition concerns in the public-sector ITO decision.   
The PSNs do not uniformly outsource a common set of developmental or operational task types with 
some outsourcing only technical support and others delegating the whole project to an ITO provider (i.e., 
the “what” component in the stage model). The most consistently successful outsourcing configurations 
included, at minimum, the project’s systems analysis and design activities and its support function. The 
PSNs seemed to have less concern for the lack of flexibility and communication difficulties that the 
literature on public-sector ITO has reported—many recognized the importance of knowledge sharing and 
were open to involving vendors in various IT activities. Taken together, these characteristics of public-
sector IT outsourcing demonstrate the complexity of assessing the bases for why public organizations 
undertake ITO and the range and uniqueness of factors that influence whether these relationships 
succeed (i.e., the “outcome” component in the stage model). 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we introduce and discuss the empirical framework, which 
provides the set of themes that we address in this study. In Section 3, we describe our methodology and 
discuss the context for the PSNs from which we drew our data. In Section 4, we analyze the data and 
present our findings. In Section 5, we discuss identified trends and their implications, present the study’s 
potential contributions and limitations, and discuss directions for future research. Finally, in Section 6, we 
conclude the paper. 
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2 Background 
ITO scholarship goes back almost as long as the practice itself. ITO research initially focused almost 
exclusively on the practice’s economic aspects but soon expanded into social and organizational 
perspectives because researchers recognized outsourcing’s strategic potential, its possible risks, and, 
more recently, the critical importance of client-vendor relationship management (e.g., Liang, Wang, Xue, & 
Cui, 2016).  
Researchers published over 800 papers on ITO between 1992 and 2013 that employed various 
theoretical lenses and prescribed many models and frameworks (Liang et al., 2016). In their review, 
Dibbern et al. (2004) cover the theories, approaches, and research methods that researchers used in the 
first decade of ITO research and propose a “stage model” of information systems outsourcing based on 
Simon’s (1960) classic four-stage (i.e., intelligence, design, choice, and implementation) decision-making 
model. We favor the stage model as it provides a comprehensive framework for managing an IT 
outsourcing project from the decision-making and implementation phases to the assessment phase.  
The first column in Table 1 captures the five stages in Dibbern et al.’s (2004) ITO stage model that gives 
structure and organization to the extensive existing body of ITO research. Several subsequent 
comprehensive literature reviews have used the stage model as an organizing vehicle. To guide our 
exploratory efforts, we include themes from later well-referenced and comprehensive ITO reviews. For 
example, Westner and Strahringer (2010) and Wiener et al. (2010) applied the stage model to offshore 
outsourcing. We note that they suggest combining the “which” and the “how” stages based on the 
argument that one cannot easily draw a clear line between the two. We show the resulting four stages in 
the second column in Table 1. We adopt these four stages from Wiener et al. (2010) as guides for 
organizing our study results. 
Lacity et al. (2017) coded 257 empirical academic publications, and their work represents the most 
comprehensive analysis of the outsourcing literature to date. They grouped the factors underlying each 
study into themes focusing on determinants of sourcing decisions or determinants of outsourcing success. 
Accordingly, we mapped the themed determinants of ITO decisions and success as Lacity et al. (2017) 
reported to the phases in the stage model (third and fifth columns of Table 1, respectively) and used 
Wiener et al.’s (2010) literature review to verify our mapping. 
Following the notation that Lacity et al. (2017) used, we coded the effects that various factors have on ITO 
decisions and success in Table 1. Specifically, we coded factors that at least 80 percent of papers found a 
positive or negative relationship for as “(++)” and “(--)”, respectively and items that 60 to 80 percent of 
papers found positive or negative relationship for as “(+)” and “(−)”, respectively. We also included one 
item that 14 researchers have studied with mixed results, which we mark with“?”.  
Table 1. Empirical Framework for the Study based on the Stage Model and Literature Reviews 
Dibbern et 
al. (2004) 
Wiener et 
al. (2010) 
Lacity et al. (2017) 
Public-sector ITO literature examples Determinants of 
ITO decisions 
Effect 
Determinants of 
ITO success 
Effect 
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Cost reduction (++)   
Cost minimization as a legal 
requirement (Burnes & Anastasiadis, 
2003; Alaranta & Jarvenpaa, 2010) 
Access to 
expertise 
(++)   
Access to expertise (Owusu-Nyamekye, 
2016), Rigid hiring policies (Khalfan & 
Gough, 2002; Willcocks & Currie, 1997).  
Business risk (-) Uncertainty (-) 
Risk/uncertainty created by short-term 
budgets (Burnes & Anastasiadis, 2003; 
Swar, Moon, Oh, & Rhee, 2012; 
Willcocks & Currie, 1997) 
External / 
internal influence 
and 
mimetic 
influences 
(++)   
Lack of vision and strategic objectives 
beyond the period of government 
mandate (Vintar & Stanimirovic, 2011), 
institutional pressures (Ya Ni & 
Bretschneider, 2007; De Looff, 1996) 
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Service 
complexity, 
interdependence 
(--) 
Service 
complexity 
(--) 
Inter-organizational and public safety 
systems are highly complex and high-
risk systems (Tomasino, 2013; 
Tomasino, Fedorowicz, Williams, 
Gentner, & Hughes, 2014) 
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losing control,  
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concerns 
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Lack of trust in vendor (Rusu & Jensen, 
2015; Swar et al., 2012), fear of loss of 
control (Lin, Pervan, & McDermid, 2007; 
Willcocks & Currie, 1997; Peled, 2001, 
Cox, Roberts, & Walton, 2012) 
Client’s technical 
and 
methodological 
capability 
(++) 
Client’s 
outsourcing 
readiness 
(++) 
Excessive and indiscriminate 
outsourcing, lack of outsourcing strategy 
(Cordella & Willcocks, 2010; Vintar & 
Stanimirovic, 2011; Willcocks & Currie, 
1997) 
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Management 
commitment 
(++) 
Lack of management commitment 
(Chen & Perry, 2003; Tomasino et al., 
2014; Owusu-Nyamekye, 2016) 
  
Evaluation 
process, 
management 
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(++) 
Public managers stick with the guidance 
and do not try to develop better control 
mechanisms (De Looff, 1996; Lin et al., 
2007; Sullivan & Ngwenyama, 2005) 
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Degree of 
outsourcing 
? 
Excessive outsourcing may lead to 
project failure (Willcocks & Currie, 
1997), loss of control and over-
dependence on the vendor (Vintar & 
Stanimirovic, 2011) 
  
Knowledge 
sharing, 
communication 
(++) 
Flexibility (Owusu-Nyamekye, 2016; 
Rusu & Jensen, 2015; Swar et al., 
2012), lack of flexibility and informal 
communication (Guah & Currie, 2007; 
Hancox & Hackney, 1999; Swar et al., 
2012) 
  
Relational 
Governance 
(++) 
Risk aversion and sticking to the 
contract (Cox et al., 2012); Strategic 
decision-making, leadership, change 
management  capability (Owusu-
Nyamekye, 2016) 
Trust, 
commitment 
(++) 
Cooperation, trust, mutual 
understanding affect outsourcing 
success (Rusu & Jensen, 2015; Swar et 
al., 2012) 
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Unlike general ITО scholarship, which includes hundreds of publications and many systematic reviews, 
the scholarship on outsourcing in the public sector remains scarce and highly geographically and 
disciplinarily scattered (Gantman, 2017). Organizations in both sectors readily apply some general ITO-
related findings. However, differences in organizational values, priorities, and culture (e.g., Boyne, 2002; 
Van Der Wal, Huberts, Van Den Heuvel, & Kolthoff, 2006); information-management approaches 
(Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1986); and attitudes toward cross-sectional collaborations (Ya Ni & 
Bretschneider, 2007; Swar et al., 2012) suggest that one cannot blindly apply private sector research to 
the public sector. In the rightmost column in Table 1, we provide example findings on public-sector ITO 
related to each research theme. In particular, we emphasize studies that illustrate sector-specific 
differentiators.  
Researchers conducted almost all the studies that Lacity et al. (2017) and Wiener et al. (2010) reviewed in 
private-sector companies. In their review, Wiener et al. also focused on offshoring, an uncommon practice 
in the public sector. As a result, we focused on variables that pertain most to the public sector and left out 
others, such as vendor capabilities and offshore countries’ characteristics.  
In our analysis, we focus on the impact of the determinants in the third and fifth columns in Table 1 on 1) 
ITO decisions (“why” and “what”) and 2) an ITO initiative’s success (“outcome”) in the public sector. The 
“how” stage requires a more nuanced analysis than our data can accommodate, and we exclude it from 
this study. We grey the themes that represent this stage in Table 1. Thus, in this paper, we address the 
following research questions:  
RQ1: Why: why do public organizations choose to outsource IT?  
RQ2: What: what IT outsourcing arrangements do public organizations typically use?  
RQ3: Outcome: what factors determine success for ITO in public organizations?  
We study select themes that Lacity et al. (2010, 2017) identified as important for ITO decisions or ITO 
success in each stage. In the “why” stage, we focus on uncertainty and service complexity. In the “what” 
stage, we focus on client organizations’ readiness and the project parts that they chose to outsource. In 
the “outcome” stage, we link the degree of outsourcing in projects to their success. In Sections 2.1 to 2.3, 
we briefly review literature about these stages and themes. 
2.1 The “Why” Stage: Why Do Public Organizations Choose to Outsource IT?  
Many researchers have studied ITO decision-making determinants, particularly in the private sector 
(Dibbern, Chin & Heinzl, 2012). Earlier research commonly focused on the motivation to pursue 
outsourcing arrangements (i.e., 63 percent (164 of 259) of all relations that Lacity et al. (2017) examined, 
which we reflect in this study with our “why” question). 
2.1.1 Why: Costs, IT Expertise Gap, and Mandates Drive Outsourcing Decisions 
The original motivation behind private-sector outsourcing decisions tended to concern economic factors 
(i.e., cost efficiency); however, strategic factors (i.e., focusing on the core business, gaining access to 
expertise) soon grew to become central decision factors in the private sector (e.g., Lacity, Khan & 
Willcocks, 2009; Liang et al., 2016).  
Research has found mixed results on the transition from economic to strategic factors as the main 
motivation for ITO in the public sector. Several studies report on requirements for governmental agencies 
to outsource everything that an outside contractor can do at a lower cost (Burnes & Anastasiadis, 2003) 
and cite regulations to hire the lowest bidder on a tender (Alaranta & Jarvenpaa, 2010). These elective or 
regulated cost-cutting requirements suggest an economic motivation for the decision to outsource. Other 
authors found that rigid employment processes and a widespread inability to match compensation levels 
that privately owned companies offer create serious difficulties in recruiting and retaining IT professionals 
in the public sector, which leaves ITO as the only real opportunity for them to attain high-level technical 
knowledge (e.g. Khalfan & Gough, 2002; Willcocks & Currie, 1997). Regulations, policies, or other 
mandate from higher authorities often prevail over an agency’s internal sourcing strategy preferences 
(Gantman, 2017).  
Since some of these drivers are similar and others differ between the two sectors, we include Lacity et 
al.’s (2017) cost reduction and access to expertise themes to examine whether the public sector has 
indeed followed the private sector in pursuing economic and strategic motivations. 
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2.1.2 Why: Risks Created by Funding Uncertainty  
Budget planning cycles drive one key difference between the private and public sectors. While private 
companies have full control over their assets, governmental organizations depend on funding allocations 
that external bodies determine. Public-sector agencies fund new projects through two distinct budgets: 1) 
capital funding for expenditures that they incur when developing and implementing projects and 2) the 
operational budget they have for their ongoing operations. 
Public agencies work under short-term (i.e., annual) operational budgets, which may change abruptly 
following events such as elections or a natural disaster. An annual budget that a governing body sets, 
usage fees from private- or public-sector users, or transfers from other government entities support a 
public agency’s operations. Public agencies can obtain capital funding through earmarks, grants, and 
other one-time allocations in government appropriations. Capital budgets are initially set years in advance 
but sometimes subject to whimsical changes due to the political climate, which poses a serious obstacle 
for long-term planning and managing a complex technology project (Burnes & Anastasiadis, 2003; 
Willcocks & Currie, 1997).  
Typically, ITO projects require an initial investment from both the client and the vendor. The uncertainty of 
a project’s future increases viability risk and may discourage vendors from bidding on a project (Gordon & 
Walsh, 1997; Willcocks & Currie, 1997). Sometimes, government entities even commence a large-scale 
initiative without the assurance of long-term financial viability (Fedorowicz et al., 2014). Currie (1996) 
quoted a public manager who describes his job as “managing in the dark”. Survey respondents in her 
study repeatedly complained that budget uncertainty does not allow for planning more than a year ahead. 
Some government agencies undertake projects as soon as they receive initial funding to reduce the 
likelihood that the funding will disappear before the funding body determines the remaining budget . These 
financial challenges occur only in the public sector and may have a significant impact on public agencies’ 
propensity to outsource IT projects. 
While public agencies widely face risk associated with financial uncertainty, private companies do so to a 
lesser degree (or not at all). The sizeable difference between private- and public-sector funding patterns 
lead to business risk and uncertainty challenges for these PSNs, which we reflect in this study with our 
“why” question. 
2.1.3 Why: Service Complexity  
Lacity, Khan, and Yan (2016) defined service complexity as “the degree to which a service or project 
requires compound steps, the control of many variables, and/or where cause and effect are subtle and 
dynamic”. Lacity et al. (2016) found and coded only six studies on service complexity, and five reported a 
negative relationship between service complexity and outsourcing (e.g., Poston, Simon & Jain, 2010; 
Aubert, Haude, Patry, & Rivard, 2012). The challenge of managing the complex relationships among a 
project’s stakeholders reduces the likelihood that an organization will decide to outsource (Jain & Thietart, 
2014). 
Governmental IT projects regularly feature both high organizational (in the number and variety of project 
stakeholders (e.g., Lin et al., 2007)) and technical (in the characteristics of the system itself (Bozeman & 
Bretschneider, 1986)) complexity. Although previous public sector-related ITO literature has not 
addressed the influence that project complexity has on ITO decisions or outcomes, given the potential 
implications of widespread complexity, we include this item in the framework. We expect to observe a 
relationship similar to what prior research has reported on both technical and organizational complexity 
(Gantman & Fedorowicz, 2016; Bosch-Rekveldt, Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker, & Verbraeck, 2011). Given 
these findings, we expect service complexity to negatively impact the decision to outsource. 
2.2 The “What” Stage 
In discussing the “what” stage, Dibbern et al. (2004) focus on alternative outsourcing strategies pertaining 
to the degree of IT asset ownership and the degree (or functional coverage) of outsourcing. Thus, we also 
address what IT outsourcing arrangements public organizations typically use (RQ2).  
Several large-scale ITO projects turned out to be wholesale failures in the mid-1990s, which triggered 
widespread discourse on total versus selective ITO as the best strategy (Willcocks & Currie, 1997). 
Outsourcing a company’s IT staff, processes, and systems bears high risks, and, therefore, researchers 
do not recommend that organizations (especially public agencies) do it (Cordella & Willcocks, 2010).  
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In addition, the public-sector ITO literature suggests that governmental agencies experience difficulties in 
building relationships with vendors and lack trust, flexibility, and the ability to communicate informally 
(Rusu & Jensen, 2015; Swar et al., 2012; Guah & Currie, 2007; Hancox & Hackney, 2000). Indeed, public-
sector scholars warn that overreliance on an external provider might indicate the organization’s inability to 
embrace the complexity of its IT function and lead to the organization to subsequently lose control over its 
IT function (Burnes & Anastasiadis, 2003; Vintar & Stanimirovic, 2011; Lin et al., 2007; Peled, 2001).  
Several studies have found a positive relationship between client organizations’ technical and 
methodological capability and outsourcing decisions (Jain & Thietart, 2014; Lacity et al., 2016, 2017). 
Given the public-sector findings to date, we predict that public-sector agencies will outsource only some of 
their IT functions (likely those for which they lack expertise). 
2.3 The Outcome Stage 
The last stage in the stage model, “outcome”, reflects various determinants and measures of success. 
Research has identified factors such as knowledge sharing, communication, relationship quality, trust, and 
relational governance as important determinants of ITO success (Lacity et al., 2016). Researchers have 
also noted that the complexity of the outsourcing relationship itself whether due to a project’s size or type 
can affect its success (Aubert et al., 2012; Tomasino et al., 2014; Poston et al., 2010). 
2.3.1 Outcome: Service Complexity  
An IT project’s complexity constitutes a central threat to its success (e.g., Tomasino et al., 2014). Lacity et 
al. (2017) coded five publications that studied service complexity, and four found a negative relationship 
between service complexity and the outcomes of the ITO project. In one of the few studies on project 
complexity that researchers have conducted in the public sector, Tomasino (2013) found that 
organizations’ difficulties with IT projects stem from a failure to acknowledge and embrace its complexity. 
Therefore, we expect to find a reverse relationship between project complexity and its outcomes, which 
reflects Lacity et al. (2017)’s service complexity theme.  
2.3.2 Outcome: Degree of Outsourcing  
Lacity et al. (2016) discussed 14 studies that look at the relationship between the degree or extent of ITO 
(i.e., the range of tasks that an ITO engagement includes) and ITO success. Interestingly, four of these 
studies found a positive relationship, five found a negative relationship, and five concluded that the extent 
of ITO has no effect on success. At the same time, studies in the public sector suggest that “excessive 
outsourcing” may stem from public agencies’ inability to manage a complex IT function and lead to project 
failure and loss of control (Lin et al., 2007; Peled, 2001; Willcocks & Currie, 1997; Vintar & Stanimirovic, 
2011). These inconsistent findings suggest they require more testing. Following the predictions that 
public-sector focused studies have made, we expect to see a negative relationship between degree of 
outsourcing and success of ITO projects. 
2.3.3 Outcome: Knowledge Sharing and the Client-Vendor Relationships 
In determining ITO success, much research has also focused on the characteristics of the relationships 
between client and outsourcing team members. ITO studies in the public sector have confirmed the 
findings in ITO research that knowledge sharing, communication, trust, and relational governance 
represent important factors for ITO success. One can best observe many typical measures of these 
factors longitudinally and at the individual level of analysis; therefore, they fall outside our scope in this 
study. Instead, we present findings on factors that one can obtain at the agency level in line with the other 
measures in this study.  
Private-sector organizations seek vendors’ involvement in developing project requirements and IT strategy 
to enable knowledge sharing and innovation. In contrast, public-sector clients who use private vendors 
often doubt the latter’s profit motives, which leads to lack of trust and the former to fear that they will lose 
control over their projects (Guah & Currie, 2007; Hancox & Hackney, 1999; Lin et al., 2007; Willcocks & 
Currie, 1997; Peled, 2001; Rusu & Jensen, 2015). Communication problems in public-private outsourcing 
relationships also arise from public agencies’ excessive adherence to formal rules (Cox et al., 2012) and a 
failure to appreciate the value of relationship building (i.e., the “procurement paradigm”; Chen & Perry, 
2003; Swar et al., 2012). Organizations can offset some of these risks by implementing practices to 
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embrace complexity (Tomasino et al., 2014), such as gap analysis and requirements definition, interactive 
project governance, and flexibility.  
We expect to see that public agencies that more openly embrace knowledge sharing with their ITO 
vendors to be more successful in their ITO arrangements.  
3 Methodology  
3.1 The Study Domain 
As we describe in Section 2, we investigate three research questions that reflect the decision-making 
stages in the stage model. These questions cover a wide range of factors that researchers have 
established to possibly affect the scope of and motivation for governmental ITO. To address these 
questions, we employed a rich descriptive dataset that contained detailed data on a well-defined category 
of public-sector ICT-based initiatives. To collect the data, the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
conducted a large-scale study that investigated inter-organizational ICT-enabled collaborations that 
supported the police’s and associated public safety organizations’ information-sharing and interoperability 
needs (Fedorowicz et al., 2014; Sawyer et al., 2013). As we state in Section 1, the term public safety 
networks (PSNs) refers to these initiatives.  
PSNs link police and other responder agencies to shared data and a common communications 
infrastructure across functional or geographic borders and usually include agencies from multiple 
governmental levels. Because they always involve multiple governmental bodies, PSNs set up a 
cooperative governing structure and obtain capital funding outside agencies’ normal operational channels. 
Further, as new entities, PSN ICT projects provide a unique opportunity to study the role that ITO plays in 
many well-defined ICT initiatives throughout their full development lifecycle. 
3.2 Data Collection  
The PSN dataset contained responses from interviews with public officials who participated in managing 
data and technology from these federal, state, metropolitan, and local initiatives. Table 2 shows the range 
of job titles that the interviewees held. The interviewees underwent pre-screening to establish that they 
had suitable knowledge about their PSN. Trained interviewers from the Pennsylvania State University 
Survey Research Center (SRC) conducted structured telephone interviews with the participants. Each 
interview took 45 to 60 minutes to administer. 
Table 2. Survey Respondents 
Job title categories N % 
Emergency services officers (with responsibilities ranging from fire and 
medical to homeland security) 
17 20.7% 
IT Project/program manager 17 20.7% 
IT Director/system manager 11 13.4% 
Law enforcement officers (police, courts, criminal investigations) 9 11% 
PSN manager 6 7.3% 
Analyst/consultant 5 6.1% 
Information manager 5 6.1% 
Operations manager 5 6.1% 
Information/data manager 4 4.9% 
Telecommunications administrator 2 2.4% 
Academic working in a PSN 1 1.2% 
Total 82 100% 
The final clean data set includes 82 full interviews that represent 39 U.S. states and the District of 
Columbia. Over 400 variables, predominantly categorical, comprehensively depict the PSNs’ 
characteristics, such as their history, organizational structure, governance, IT architecture, and ITO 
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experience (Fedorowicz et al., 2014; Fedorowicz, Sawyer, & Tomasino, 2018). The structured interview 
also covers other themes such as the PSN’s overall mission; IT outsourcing’s role, characteristics, and 
success; the PSN’s organizational structure and governance; funding sources; ICT used; types of data the 
PSNs stored and shared; communication practices among the PSN’s members; performance metrics; 
satisfaction with its operation; and experienced problems. In this study, we use a subset of the survey 
results, which we describe in Section 3.3. 
3.3 Data  
The survey that we base our study on included over 100 questions about PSNs’ initiation and operation, 
which included their outsourcing experience. Given the data’s richness, we could include variables in our 
analysis that reflect important aspects of a PSN’s functioning to more deeply understand the 
circumstances surrounding PSNs’ sourcing experience.  
We depict the PSNs’ geographic distribution in Figure 1. One can see that the PSNs resided across the 
US but that they had more prominence in heavily populated areas. Further, 47 of the 82 PSNs (57.3%) 
had outsourced some or all of their IT functions. This distribution provides a good mix of project ITO 
experience on which to base our analysis. Most outsourcing PSNs perceived that they had achieved their 
outsourcing goals in full or in part (Table 3). Due to this success rate, in our outcome analysis, we focused 
on identifying behavior patterns that led to successful goal attainment. 
 
 
Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Outsourcing and Non-outsourcing PSNs 
 
Table 3. Success in Achieving Outsourcing Goals  
Goal achievement levels N % 
Outsourcing goals have been achieved 33 70.2% 
Outsourcing goals have been achieved in part 10 21.3% 
Outsourcing goals have not been achieved 3 6.4% 
“Too early to tell” 1 2.1% 
Total 47 100% 
3.4 Data Analysis 
We cleaned and coded the raw data set that mostly included categorical variables for analysis; we created 
indices when appropriate for assessing constructs such as project complexity.  
To analyze the data, we mostly compared means using independent samples t-tests and cross-
tabulations with Pearson’s chi-square tests. 
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In all tables that include results from independent samples t-tests, the reported test significance is two-
sided. We performed Levene’s (1960) test of equality of variances prior to each t-test and then made 
appropriate adjustments to the value and significance of t.  We mark statistically significant results at the 
0.05 level with an asterisk (*) and statistically significant results at the 0.01 level with two asterisks (**). 
In all tables that report results from Pearson’s chi-square tests, the reported test significance is asymptotic 
and two-sided. We mark statistically significant results at the 0.05 level an asterisk (*) and statistically 
significant results at the 0.01 level with two asterisks (**). 
We also used the Boolean algebra-based qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) method (Rihoux & 
Ragin, 2009) to identify patterns in the PSNs’ outsourcing behavior and, in particular, to understand the 
possible connection between a PSN’s decision to outsource specific IT functions or specific parts of the 
system development lifecycle and the ITO project’s outcomes. We analyzed which functions and tasks are 
outsourced together and then considered the rate of success in each group. QCA determines all possible 
configurations of data factors that lead to an indicated outcome; these configurations are the multiple 
pathways identified to reach a common objective. One evaluates QCA solutions based on two criteria: 1) 
solution coverage, which relates to the proportion of cases that exhibit the condition; and 2) solution 
consistency, which measures the proportion of cases where the condition produces the outcome. High 
consistency values indicate the condition is sufficient for the output (Ragin, 2008).  
When looking for a parsimonious definition for successful outsourcing strategies, we applied truth table 
analysis using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm with 90 percent as the threshold for solution consistency. 
We present the resulting configurations of outsourcing components that most consistently led to ITO 
success in Table 17.    
4 Findings 
In Section 2, we match the findings from the general ITO literature that Lacity et al. (2010, 2017) and 
Wiener et al. (2010) surveyed with the stage model and with the literature on ITO in the public sector and 
propose three questions referencing the three stages of the stage model: what and why, which describe 
factors that lead to the decision to outsource and the decision of what to outsource, and outcome, which 
describes the determinants of ITO success. We structure our findings from analyzing the PSN dataset in a 
similar way. 
4.1 The “Why” Stage 
The first stage in the Stage Model, “why”, explores the role that various organizational and environmental 
characteristics play in an organization’s decision to hire an external provider for its IT needs. We address 
this stage with RQ1 (i.e., “why do public organizations choose to outsource IT?”). 
4.1.1 Cost Considerations, Access to Expertise, and Mandate to Outsource  
Respondents could select up to three reasons for outsourcing: 1) cost cutting; 2) gaining access to 
technical expertise (two themes that both the general and public sector-specific ITO literature have often 
mentioned); and 3) policies, regulations, or mandates (a recurring theme in the public-sector ITO 
literature). They could also add their own answer. We examined and reclassified interviewee-supplied 
responses when appropriate into one of the three main choices. We summarize the answers that the 
study participants provided about sourcing decisions in Table 4 and visualize them in Figure 2. 
Obtaining access to technical expertise turned out to be a primary motivation for most (63%) respondents, 
and all but three (93.5%) PSNs considered it. Only 14 of 46 respondents selected cost as a main driver for 
their decision to outsource, and none reported it as their sole motivation. This finding concurs with the 
general ITO literature that has observed a shift in the main motivation for ITO from reducing costs to 
gaining access to technical expertise. This shift took much longer to arrive in the public sector compared 
to the private sector (Gantman, 2017). Our findings suggest that the public sector has “caught up” with the 
private sector, and access to technical expertise has begun to dominate PSNs’ decision to outsource as is 
the case for private companies. 
Finally, seven PSNs (15.2%) indicated policies and regulations guided their decision to outsource 
alongside both cost-cutting and staff-expertise shortages. Notably, the only three PSNs in the sample who 
did not report a staffing shortage all claimed that they only outsourced because higher authorities required 
them to do so.  
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Table 4. The Main Reasons to Outsource 
Outsourcing reasons Number Percent 
Availability or expertise of staff alone 29 63.1% 
Policies, regulations, or mandate alone 3 6.5% 
Cost cutting alone 0 0.0% 
Availability or expertise of staff and cost cutting 10 21.7% 
All three reasons (availability of expertise or staff, 
policies and regulations and cost cutting) 
4 8.7% 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagram of “Why” PSNs Outsource 
4.1.2 Risk and Uncertainty Related to Availability of Funding 
Table 5 examines the proposition that having funding available (i.e., as seed funds or capital funding 
appropriations) as a stimulus for PSN creation affects a PSN’s ITO decision and that the presence or 
absence of funds and financial stability affects the ITO’s role in a PSN. The PSNs created due to available 
funds had a significantly higher outsourcing rate compared to the PSNs that did not list accessible funding 
among their formation’s triggers.  
 
Table 5. PSNs Listing Availability of External Funding as one of the Triggers for PSN Formation 
 Outsourcers 
Non-
outsourcers 
Total 
Pearson’s Chi^2 
Chi^2 Sig. 
PSNs triggered by funding availability 39 (66.1%) 20 (33.9%) 59 
6.635 0.01** Other PSNs 8 (34.8%) 15 (65.2%) 23 
Total 47 (57.3%) 35 (42.7%) 82 
 
As Table 6 shows, PSNs were more likely to outsource when they could rely on externally provided capital 
funds (typically grants and appropriations). PSNs that supported themselves through service charges, 
membership fees, and subscriptions were less likely to outsource their IT. 
Table 6. Funding Composition 
Funding sources 
Mean % 
St. Dev. 
t-test 
Non-out-
sourcers (31) 
Outsourcers (45) t Sig. 
Grants, bonds, appropriations, earmarks, 
other capital funding 
68.7% 86.5% 
38.5 2.132 .037* 
Charges, subscriptions, other fees 31.3% 13.5% 
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4.1.3 Service Complexity   
Multiple studies in different disciplines have addressed how to measure complexity in IT projects and 
offered dozens of variables that one can use to assess and compare projects’ complexity. We present 
three views of complexity that fit well with these shared systems’ interorganizational public setting. The 
first two examine the reported variety of user types and project objectives, and the third examines the 
project’s technological architecture.  
Organizational complexity (users): the PSNs in our sample were created for assorted public safety 
purposes, such as to provide services or support users. Because each user type (e.g., state or local 
police, fire, EMT) has differing needs and priorities for the shared PSN resources, the more user types a 
PSN needs to support, the greater its complexity. Thus, the number of intended user types represents one 
way to measure the complexity of a PSN’s information service.  
The survey asked participants to identify primary and secondary users of their services, and they could 
choose from among four options: federal agencies, state agencies, local agencies, and private 
companies. They could also name additional intended users. Eighteen PSNs identified additional users; 
the most frequently mentioned included the public, non-profit organizations, tribes, and health services.  
Table 7 shows how many user types on average the outsourcing and non-outsourcing PSNs supported. 
Outsourcing PSNs had a greater variety of intended user types compared to non-outsourcers, and we 
found similar results when we considered only primary users.  
Table 7. Average Number of Primary and Secondary User Types  
Number of user types 
Non-outsourcers (35) Outsourcers (47) t-test 
Mean St. dev Mean St. dev t Sig. 
Primary users only 1.74 0.817 2.13 0.850 -2.061 0.043* 
Secondary users only 1.25 1.094 1.34 1.028 -.350 0.727 
Primary and secondary users 3.00 1.030 3.47 0.856 -2.246 0.027* 
Organizational complexity (objectives): the range of technology-related objectives that a PSN pursued 
represents another way to measure system complexity. PSNs deal with various (including many outdated) 
systems. We focus here on IT objectives related to integrating these systems and standardizing data and 
provided services to indicate technological service complexity.  
Table 8 summarizes the prevalence of different IT goals in the outsourcing and non-outsourcing PSNs. 
Outsourcing PSNs focused on leveraging existing investments in IT and on increasing how frequently they 
used data standards, such as Global Justice XML. Interestingly, in their review in which they analyzed IT 
and business process outsourcing studies together, Lacity et al. (2016) mentioned knowledge 
formalization and service standardization as factors for organizations’ ITO decisions, but these factors do 
not appear in Lacity et al. (2010) and Lacity et al. (2017): two reviews that focused on IT outsourcing 
alone. 
Table 8. IT Objectives in Outsourcing vs. Non-outsourcing PSNs 
 
Non-
outsourcers 
(35) 
Outsourcers 
(47) 
Total 
(with this 
objective) 
% of total 
who are 
outsourcers 
Pearson Chi^2 
IT objectives N % N % Chi^2 Sig. 
Increasing the number of users who 
can get access to data 
25 71% 41 87% 66 62.1% 3.191 .074 
Increasing data security 28 80% 40 85% 68 58.8% .369 .543 
Increasing the number of data 
sources available to users and/or 
consolidating systems 
25 71% 40 85% 65 61.5% 2.284 .131 
Leveraging existing investments in IT 27 77% 44 94% 71 62% 4.687 .030* 
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Upgrading or replacing aging IT 
infrastructure, improving IT 
infrastructure reliability 
28 80% 41 87% 69 59.4% .787 .375 
Increasing use of data standards 
(e.g., Global Justice XML or National 
Information Exchange Model) 
25 71% 42 89% 67 62.7% 4.316 .038* 
Technical complexity: we assessed the technical complexity of PSN systems as the variety of their 
architectural elements (see Table 9). Data-oriented PSNs, especially those that centralized data storage 
and those that focused on standardizing the data and making it available to more PSNs, showed notably 
higher rates of outsourcing and built more architecturally complex systems in terms of data storage and 
use (see Table 10). 
Table 9. Architecture Elements in Outsourced vs. Non-outsourced PSN Projects 
 
  Total 
(with this 
element) 
% of total 
who were 
outsourcers 
Chi-square 
test 
N % N % Chi^2 Sig. 
Central data storage (of 
82) 
20 58.8% 38 80.9% 58 65.5% 4.708 0.030* 
Access to data 
not available before (of 
82) 
24 70.6% 44 93.6% 68 64.7% 7.765 0.005** 
Data standardization 
(Global Justice XML) (of 
70) 
17 58.6% 34 82.9% 51 66.7% 5.074 0.024* 
Legacy systems (of 60) 6 23.1% 9 26.5% 15 60% .090 0.764 
Mobile access (of 82) 23 65.7% 35 74.5% 58 60.3% .743 0.389 
Business process 
standardization (of 74) 
22 73.3% 35 79.5% 57 61.4% .389 0.533 
 
Table 10. Average Number of Different IT Objectives and Architectural Elements in Outsourced vs. Non-
outsourced PSN Projects 
 
Non-outsourcing (35) Outsourcing (47) t-test 
  Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. t Sig. 
Total IT objectives (0 to 6) 4.51 1.915 5.28 1.057 -2.126 .039* 
       
Data-related architectural elements (0-3) 1.74 1.17 2.47 0.75 -3.21 0.002** 
Non-data-related architectural elements (0-3) 1.37 .77 1.68 .78 -1.782 .079 
The number of IT objectives and the complexity of a system’s architecture were predictably correlated with 
a Pearson correlation of .629 (significant at .001). However, we found no correlation between the variety 
of intended user types and the number of IT objectives, and a low correlation between user types and total 
architectural elements (r = .219, significance .048). This observation confirms the independence of 
findings that we report in Table 7 (the variety of PSN’s users) and Table 8 (the number of PSN’s IT 
objectives). Each complexity measure affected ITO decisions in a distinctive way. 
4.2 The “What” Stage  
The second stage in the IT outsourcing model, “what”, explores the outsourced projects’ technical and 
organizational configuration. This stage focuses on the degree, or extent, of outsourcing. As not all ITO 
contracts govern the client’s IT organization to the same extent, we need to document how ITO 
arrangements apportion activities. Some studies have warned against outsourcing IT in its entirety and 
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suggested that it may subsequently result in an organization’s losing control over its IT (Cordella & 
Willcocks, 2010; Vintar & Stanimirovic, 2011, Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Willcocks & Currie, 1997).  
4.2.1 Extent of Outsourcing Arrangements 
The degree of outsourcing depends on the client’s needs and, therefore, often reflects the reasoning 
behind an outsourcing decision (“why”). In particular, since PSNs reported inadequate internal technical 
expertise, the ITO arrangements likely reflected the skill sets they lacked. The PSNs in our data set 
reported that they outsourced IT project parts in many combinations (see Tables 11 and 12). (We also 
present further analysis in Table 17.) 
Table 11. Percentage of PSNs Outsourcing Different Parts of IT Projects 
 N % of 47 cases 
System analysis 24 51.1% 
System design 31 66% 
Project management 28 59.6% 
Programming 18 38.3% 
Support functions 44 93.6% 
 
Table 12. Percentage of PSNs Outsourcing Multiple Parts of IT Projects 
 N % of all cases 
All five  11 23.4% 
Four  7 14.9% 
Three  9 19.15% 
Two  15 31.9% 
One  5 10.6% 
Total 47 100% 
4.2.2 Vendor Involvement  
We look at the ITO vendors’ involvement in project-related decision making as a proxy for the PSNs’ 
openness to share knowledge and build a relationship with them. If prior research findings on the lack of 
trust in a vendor’s motives and strict adherence to formal rules in communication hold for the ITO 
relationships between public organizations and vendors, we expect that most PSNs will limit vendors’ 
involvement in project-related decision making and knowledge sharing.  
Table 13 summarizes the PSNs’ responses regarding their vendors’ involvement in sharing technical 
expertise, defining requirements, and making IT strategy suggestions and advice. PSNs did take 
advantage of their outsourcing vendors’ expertise in all three categories. These results disprove the 
proposition that PSNs are reluctant to let their vendors participate in decision making and knowledge 
sharing. 
Table 13. Vendor’s Involvement in IT-related Activities in the PSN 
Vendor activity Not involved % Involved % 
Sharing technical expertise 7 14.9% 40 85.1% 
Definition of requirements 11 23.4% 36 76.6% 
IT strategy suggestions and advice 9 19.1% 38 80.9% 
Other activities
1
 N/A N/A 7 14.9% 
                                                     
1
 Seven PSNs reported other activities as an open response: policy development, assistance with regional 
coordination and regional network architecture, business processes mapping, Web and database design. We omit 
these responses from the analysis because the survey did not ask all respondents. 
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However, the extent of vendor involvement was correlated with the extent of outsourcing (r = .374, 
significance .010). The PSNs that outsourced all five project parts reported significantly higher level of 
vendor involvement compared to all others (t = -3.393, significance 0.001).  
4.3 Outcomes  
The final stage in the IT outsourcing model, “outcome”, explores the factors that determine a project’s 
success. Overall, the PSNs’ ITO initiatives had an impressively high success rate (see Table 14). Only 
three PSNs reported that their ITO efforts failed (the same three PSNs that claimed that higher authorities 
forced them to outsource). Of the remaining 44 outsourcers, only 10 (22.7%) reported that they had not 
achieved their outsourcing goals in full.  
Table 14. Success in Achieving Outsourcing Goals 
Goal-achievement levels N % 
Outsourcing goals have been achieved 33 70.2% 
Outsourcing goals have been achieved in part 10 21.3% 
Outsourcing goals have not been achieved 3 6.4% 
“Too early to tell” 1 2.1% 
Total 47 100% 
4.3.1 Project Complexity and ITO Outcomes  
As Table 1 shows, we found service complexity as one of the few factors to influence both the decision to 
outsource and a project’s propensity to succeed (according to Lacity et al., 2017). In Table 15, we 
compare the complexity measurements that we discuss in Section 4.1.4 for successful and less-
successful outsourcing PSNs. In contrast with the findings that the literature has found in the private 
sector where service complexity negatively affects a project’s success (Lacity et al., 2017), we found an 
outsourced PSN project’s complexity did not affect its chance to succeed. 
Table 15. Measures of Project Complexity and Outsourcing Success 
 
Successful 
outsourcing 
(33) 
Partially or 
unsuccessful 
outsourcing (13) 
t-test 
Mean 
St. 
dev. 
Mean St. dev. T 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Organizational complexity: number of user types 3.42 0.867 3.62 0.870 -0.673 0.505 
Organizational complexity: number of IT objectives 5.30 1.075 5.15 1.068 0.425 0.673 
Technical complexity: number of architectural elements 4.15 1.278 4.00 1.354 0.356 0.723 
Data related 2.52 0.712 2.31 0.855 0.840 0.405 
Not data related 1.64 0.783 1.69 0.751 -0.221 0.826 
4.3.2 Degree of Outsourcing  
As we report in Section 4.2.1, the PSNs used various outsourcing configurations, and several IT project 
parts participated in multiple configurations. This finding suggests that multiple paths to a successful 
project outcome exist, which drove our decision to choose the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
method to examine this topic (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).  
In Table 16, we summarize success rates of different outsourcing configurations that the PSNs reported. 
Notably, all but one PSN that chose to outsource all parts of the IT project reported achieving their 
outsourcing goals. 
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Table 16. Success Rates of Different Outsourcing Configurations 
Outsourced IT project parts 
N 
% of all 
cases 
Success Success rate 
System 
analysis 
System 
design 
Coding PM 
Technology 
support 
x x x x x 11 24.4% 10 91% 
   x x 9 20% 6 67% 
x x   x 6 13.3% 6 100% 
 x   x 3 6.7% 2 67% 
 x x x x 3 6.7% 1 33% 
x x x  x 2 4.4% 2 100% 
x x  x x 2 4.4% 2 100% 
    x 2 4.4% 2 100% 
 x  x x 2 4.4% 0 0% 
x     1 2.2% 0 0% 
 x    1 2.2% 0 0% 
 x x  x 1 2.2% 0 0% 
   x  1 2.2% 1 100% 
 46 100% 33 71.1% 
In Table 17, we parsimoniously define successful outsourcing strategies that we produced using the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm with a 90 percent threshold for solution consistency. Two resulting 
configurations included cases with limited outsourcing arrangements.  
Table 17. QCA Results for Outsourcing Project Configurations 
Intermediate Solution (cut off 95%) 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Condition 
consistency 
Number of 
PSNs in 
this 
condition 
Number of 
successful 
PSNs in this 
condition 
System Analysis, Design and Tech Support 0.63 0.63 0.95 21 20 
Project Management only 0.03 0.03 1 1 1 
Technical Support functions only 0.06 0.06 1 2 2 
Total solution coverage: 0.697; Solution consistency: 0.96 
We found that 21 PSNs in our sample outsourced system analysis, system design, and technical support; 
all but one considered the outsourcing arrangement successful. Half of this group (i.e., 10 PSNs) 
outsourced the entire project, while the other ten retained project management and programming in house 
(see Table 16). The single unsuccessful case was one of the three PSNs that reported that policies, 
regulations, or mandates forced it to outsource (see Table 4). 
Other outsourcing tactics, such as hiring a consultant for system analysis or system design alone, 
outsourcing project management and support but not project implementation, and delegating system 
development to an external provider while keeping technical support in house, showed mixed results as to 
whether PSNs achieved their outsourcing goals, and these tactics did not meet the QCA algorithm’s 
conditional cutoff. Thus, the most common path for PSNs to achieve success lies in outsourcing (at least) 
system analysis, design, and support functions. 
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4.3.3 Trust, Communication, and Effective Knowledge Sharing 
Prior research suggests that PSNs’ readiness to embrace knowledge sharing and involve vendors in 
strategy development will affect ITO success. In Table 18, we contrast the frequencies of three vendor-
involvement activities in successful and less-successful PSNs. A vendor’s involvement in sharing 
technical expertise and definition of requirements was associated with more successful ITO projects. ITO 
projects that involved vendors more extensively were also more likely to achieve their goals. 
Table 18. Vendor’s Involvement in IT-related Activities 
  
Successful 
outsourcers (33) 
Partially or 
unsuccessful 
outsourcers (13) 
Total 
outsourcing 
PSNs (46) 
Pearson’s Chi^2 
or t-test 
N % N % N % Chi^2 Sig. 
Sharing technical expertise 31 93.9% 8 61.5% 39 84.8% 7.589 .006** 
Definition of requirements 30 90.9% 5 38.5% 35 76.1% 14.10 .000** 
IT strategy suggestions and advice 28 84.8% 9 69.2% 37 80.4% 1.45 .229 
Other activities (open response) 6 18% 1 7.7% 7 14.9% .988 .610 
 Mean St. dev Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. t Sig. 
Total number of reported activities 
(range is 0 to 3) 
2.70 .684 1.69 1.182 2.33 1.049 -2.88 .011* 
5 Discussion  
While ITO does not represent a new research area, only a relatively small and highly fragmented subset 
academic work on the topic has documented the ITO challenges that governmental agencies face. Many 
papers on public-sector ITO rely on single case studies that one can generalize only with caution 
(Gantman, 2017). In this paper, we use seminal reviews of the general ITO literature (Dibbern et al., 2004; 
Lacity et al., 2010, 2017; Wiener et al., 2010) to map known private-sector ITO research themes into the 
public sector to provide a more comprehensive lens through which to view ITO in the public sector. Short-
term budgets, government mandates, funding often linked to political events or disasters, and lack of trust 
in public-private partnerships illustrate the kinds of unique issues that differentiate the public sector from 
the private sector. By contextualizing these issues as public-sector decision-making or success factors in 
this organizing framework, we assist both practitioners and researchers in understanding how best to 
evaluate the complex arrangements surrounding these important decisions. 
We analyzed a rich set of data that covered a single government domain (i.e., public safety). By studying 
a large number of public safety networks, we could contrast similar entities that outsourced IT to those 
that did not. We tested several characteristics of public-sector ITO behaviors that researchers have noted 
to lag or diverge from trends in the private sector. In Table 19, we organize our findings according to the 
stages in the stage model. 
Table 19. Summary of Results 
Stages in the 
stage model 
(Dibbern et al., 
2004) 
Findings 
Implications for future research (R) or practice 
(P) 
“Why” 
 
Determinants 
Advantages 
Disadvantages 
Motivation 
Similar to the private sector, the need for 
technical expertise most prevalently drove 
the PSNs to outsource.  
Unlike private companies, some PSNs 
reported that government mandates forced 
them to outsource.  
PSNs mandated to outsource failed to 
achieve project objectives.  
(P) Regulatory bodies may consider loosening 
regulations to allow public agencies to broaden ITO 
decision criteria beyond legal or regulatory 
compliance.  
(R) More deeply analyzing the relationship between 
coerced outsourcing and project failure may lead to 
better regulatory guidance for government 
agencies. 
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Table 19. Summary of Results 
Risk and uncertainty (funding):  
Unlike private companies, PSNs depended 
highly on external funding.  
PSNs created due to accessible initial 
funding outsourced twice as often as others. 
Outsourcing PSNs were less likely to obtain 
finance via charges and fees.  
(P) Government agencies should strive to attain 
capital funds whether or not projects will entail 
significant outsourcing components. 
(R) The relationship between funding availability 
and sources deserves more attention to determine 
why sourcing matters in ITO decision making. 
Complexity 
Contrary to private sector findings, PSNs 
outsourced organizationally and technically 
complex projects more often. 
(R) A more nuanced insight into the different types 
of and reasons for project complexity and their 
effect on the decision to outsource would benefit 
ITO research in both the public and the private 
sectors.  
“What” 
 
Degree of 
outsourcing 
Extent 
(P) By design, PSNs are dynamic and collaborative 
initiatives that join disparate public agencies. This 
organizational design may contribute to increased 
trust in an ITO arrangement.  
(R) Research that compares single and multi-
agency ITO arrangements may detect differences 
in vendor arrangements due to established 
organizational relationships. 
See also below in “outcomes”. 
Contrary to earlier research about the 
public sector, many PSNs delegated all 
their IT project parts to an outsourcing 
vendor. 
Vendor involvement 
Contrary to earlier research about the 
public sector, most PSNs’ vendors 
participated in sharing knowledge, defining 
requirements, and developing IT strategic 
goals.  
“Outcome” 
 
Experiences 
Types 
Determinants 
Complexity 
Contrary to private sector findings, a 
project’s complexity had no adverse effect 
on ITO success.  
(R) (P) Although one can expect complex systems 
to fail more than simpler ones, it may be that ITO 
vendor expertise offsets in-house understanding of 
complex arrangements in PSNs. Or it may be that 
PSNs could recognize and embrace the complexity 
of their ITO projects and, therefore, mitigate the 
risks inherent in IT project complexity. More case 
studies (such as Tomasino, 2013) will help 
researchers identify recommendations for 
practitioners and advance the theoretical base for 
understanding complexity of IT projects.  
Configuration 
Contrary to earlier research about the 
public sector, PSNs that voluntarily 
outsourced all their IT project parts achieved 
their outsourcing goals. 
The most successful ITO configuration 
included system analysis, system design, 
and technical support. Some successful 
PSNs also outsourced coding and project 
management. 
(P) Public agencies should adopt a holistic 
approach to IT projects, analyze the 
interdependencies between their different parts, 
and develop an outsourcing configuration that 
allows for vendors’ involvement in project work that 
draws heavily on their expertise. Agencies should 
also consider ITO for the whole project lifecycle 
(from system analysis to technical support).   
Vendor Involvement 
Similar to the private sector, PSNs 
promoting knowledge sharing and vendor 
involvement were more likely to succeed in 
IT outsourcing. 
(R) (P) To succeed, ITO in both sectors requires 
vendor involvement and knowledge sharing. 
However, public agencies can find both vendor 
involvement and knowledge sharing especially 
challenging. Studies that examine the relationship 
between funding availability and the types and 
timing of vendor involvement will have important 
implications for practitioners and will help 
researchers gain better insight into factors under an 
agency’s control that can affect ITO success.  
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5.1 Why do Public Organizations Choose to Outsource IT (RQ1)?  
5.1.1 Motivation 
The first set of analyses correspond to the “why” stage in which an entity bases its decision to outsource 
on specified criteria. As we expected, many PSNs identified cost cutting as an outsourcing driver, an 
unsurprising observation because legal requirements often force public agencies to minimize costs 
(Gantman, 2017). Less surprisingly, no PSNs reported cost cutting as the sole reason to outsource. 
Rather, a lack of technical expertise most prevalently drove PSNs to outsource—a trend consistent with 
previous findings in both sectors (Leimeister & Krcmar, 2009; Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopes, 2010). All 
voluntarily outsourcing PSNs sought external technical expertise (often as their only outsourcing driver).  
Some study participants reported that regulations or mandates forced them to outsource or to switch ITO 
providers. In line with extant findings that political factors may motivate ITO decisions (Gantman, 2017), 
the few PSNs who had to outsource due to mandates also failed to achieve their outsourcing goals. This 
finding suggests a problem with regulatory efforts to govern outsourcing in that public agencies need 
freedom to broaden their decision criteria to factors beyond legal compliance. In other words, coercion 
does not positively motivate ITO.  
5.1.2 Risk/Uncertainty (Funding) 
PSNs, like all government agencies, depend highly on external capital funds from grants, appropriations, 
and other governmental sources. PSNs created due to this accessible initial funding tended to outsource 
twice as often as others. However, PSNs’ fund source differentiated PSNs that outsourced from PSNs that 
did not: outsourcing PSNs were less likely to obtain finance from charges, subscriptions, and fees. Future 
research should investigate the reason for this curious difference. 
5.1.3 Service Complexity and Interdependency 
Lacity et al. (2017) coded six studies that looked into the relationship between project complexity and 
outsourcing decision, and five found a negative effect of service complexity on outsourcing (e.g., Jain & 
Thietart, 2014). In contrast, we found that PSNs with (both technically and organizationally) more complex 
systems tended to outsource more often. Incongruously, outsourcing itself adds an additional layer of 
organizational complexity to a project at the same time that it offloads some responsibility for the technical 
complexity. This finding may have arisen due to public sector’s longstanding shortage of technical 
expertise as their primary reason for outsourcing; the more complex the requested service, the stronger 
their reliance on external IT expertise. Unlike most packaged business software, PSN systems have few if 
any generic components and often must conform to shared standards with which vendors would have 
experience. Future research that investigates the factors behind an outsourcing decision should examine 
the specific system requirements, technical skills, and competencies that agencies themselves cannot 
provide. 
Outsourcing PSNs identified more goals for their outsourcing projects and, thus, recognized that they 
needed to embrace an IT project’s complexity for it to succeed (Tomasino, 2013). They also place more 
emphasis on data-oriented elements of system architecture, such as centralized data storage and 
compliance with data standards. These findings align with the observation that access to technical 
expertise is the strongest driver of public-sector ITO. 
5.2 What IT Outsourcing Arrangements do Public Organizations Typically Use 
(RQ2)? 
The “what” stage focuses on the extent of a project’s activity that an agency outsources. ITO strategies 
evolved to cover multiple project activities in most projects we examined. Most PSNs also involved 
vendors in sharing technical expertise, defining requirements, and developing IT strategy, which signifies 
that the public sector has overcome lack of trust in and fear of losing control to private sector vendors as 
earlier studies have reported (Willcocks & Currie, 1997). 
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5.3 Outcome: What Factors Determine Success for ITO in Public Organizations 
(RQ3)?  
The “outcome” stage focuses on the factors that determine a project’s success. Lacity et al. (2017) coded 
five studies that looked into the connection between service complexity and ITO success in the private 
sector, and four found that more complex outsourced projects are less likely to achieve success. 
However, this finding did not apply to the PSNs we studied. None of the three aspects of complexity that 
we analyzed had any effect (negative or positive) on ITO success. As both the decision making and 
success findings on complexity in our study counter what Lacity et al. (2017) found, we recommend that 
researchers conduct further studies to determine if these differences result from sectoral incongruences, 
an evolution of thinking over time, or a methodological disparity. 
Finally, we identified specific activity configurations that were associated with more successful projects. 
Successful projects consistently outsourced system analysis, system design, and technical support; some 
successful outsourcing also included coding and project management tasks. Projects where clients asked 
vendors to share their technical expertise and participate in requirements definitions were more successful 
than those that did not. Future research might investigate whether vendors’ early involvement helps a 
project formulate the right requirements in its request for proposal (particularly important in the public 
sector given public agencies cannot easily change the content in a request for proposal once a project has 
begun) or whether it indicates that projects with secure funding for the whole project lifecycle end up being 
more successful than those who stop due to stopped funding
2
. Further research into the decision to 
outsource each of these activity types would provide strong guidance to public-sector managers as to the 
benefits that lead to these more productive relationships. 
In sum, we demonstrate how the themes that Lacity et al. (2017) identified according to the stages in the 
stage model (Dibbern et al., 2004) fit in the public sector and explain when our findings replicate or differ 
from what researchers have found in the private sector. We encourage government agencies to view their 
ITO decisions in the purview of the findings and themes that we present in this study as a means to 
reduce the high rate of failure in public-sector outsourcing. As with much research, we could not 
thoroughly test the model in this domain; we need further research to fully understand how the public 
sector might best apply the model. 
5.4 Limitations 
Since we build our model on prior research, it inherits that research’s limitations. While Weiner et al. 
(2010) and Lacity et al. (2017) successfully employed the Dibbern et al. (2004) model as an organizing 
mechanism, the scarcity, interdisciplinarity, and geographical fragmentation of public-sector ITO research 
preclude the model’s applicability in this sector pending additional study. In summarizing prior public-
sector research and analyzing our sample of public-sector ITO projects, we obtained the ability to examine 
differences in ITO decision making and outcomes in many of the themed areas. However, alternative 
explanations for differences between the sectors due to research design considerations such as differing 
measures, methods, timing of data collection, or other factors may exist. 
Since public organizations rely on governmental guidance and prevailing political environment, one should 
exercise caution when generalizing findings from different countries in one framework. We note, however, 
most public ITO literature published in the English language describes English-speaking countries with 
relatively similar political systems. The few international comparisons in the academic literature on public 
ITO suggest that, despite some differences, these countries have many similarities. 
We used a rich dataset on PSNs to test the propositions related to various aspects of an ITO project that 
we include in Table 1. The PSNs varied substantially in size, age, maturity level, organizational goals, and 
applied governance mechanisms. However, the variety in the PSNs’ structures and governance schemes 
has one salient drawback: the interviewed informants had different job titles and somewhat different 
formal responsibilities. While the survey organizers made a significant effort to identify the most 
knowledgeable person in each PSN, the depth of each interviewee’s knowledge and the quality of 
answers could have varied from participant to participant. 
                                                     
2
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this question. 
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As our sample examined only interorganizational public safety projects from a single country, we cannot 
generalize our findings to all public-sector domains globally. While we believe that many of our findings 
generalize to many other types of public service organizations, PSNs’ ITO behavior may differ from other 
types of public service (e.g., tax assessment). Applying the same set of propositions to data on other 
types of governmental agencies and in other countries would help further verify our findings’ reliability and 
generalizability. 
6 Conclusion 
This work comprises an important addition to the literature on ITO in the public sector—a relatively 
understudied phenomenon that deserves closer attention from researchers. We extend previous IT 
outsourcing research by systematically mapping unique traits and perils that outsourcing public agencies 
face onto an outsourcing model from a seminal, widely cited ITO study (Dibbern et al., 2004) alongside 
two extensive meta-analyses of empirical ITO research (Wiener et al., 2010; Lacity et al., 2010, 2016). We 
also analyze a unique and robust survey of 82 public safety networks to empirically test significant 
portions of the model and, thus, demonstrate its value to both research and practice. 
This study also makes an important contribution to practice. It helps outsourcing vendors understand the 
unique challenges that governmental agencies face. It will benefit public officials who can use our 
observations to support their risk-analysis and sourcing decisions. 
The study is confirmatory in nature as it relies on an empirically derived model. In the future, the findings 
we present would benefit from more systematic and theory-based scholarship to broaden our contribution 
to a more diverse set of public safety domains.  
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